As evidenced by recent events, the global race to control the proliferation and development of artificial intelligence (AI) is in full swing and seems an integral part of the broader competition between the United States and China. Despite various US attempts to curtail China’s progress, its industry and policy in the sector continues to advance positioning it as a key player. Xi Jinping’s prioritization of AI development since 2017, is fuelling China’s race to become the world’s dominant AI power and ultimately “science and technology superpower.” (1) At its core, the Chinese Communist Party seeks to harness AI as both a tool of ideological governance and a lever for reshaping global norms. This dual strategy is emblematic of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) broader efforts to challenge and redefine existing frameworks to align with its authoritarian values. The potential Chinese domination of the sector, particularly through open-source AI, brings with it the risk of a techno-authoritarian AI ecosystem mirroring China’s broader revisionist goals (2, 3).

Revisionism in Chinese politics

In 2008, after a prolonged period of oscillating between more and less aggressive foreign policy, Chinese posturing became once again more muscular, likely prompted by the international balance of power starting to shift in China’s favour (4). At the same time, a modern concept of “Tianxia” took hold amongst China’s intellectuals. A new global order that reproduced “China’s hierarchical empire for the twenty-first century” (5, p. 750), which was meant to be an alternative to the liberal system. A system under China’s authority and leadership to “unite all others towards peace, harmony, and prosperity.” (6, p. 18) A system that valued “order over freedom, ethics over law, and elite governance over democracy and human rights” (5, p. 753). Ideas that Xi Jinping took on board, as evident in his proposal for “a community for a shared destiny” (6, p. 28). A plan that is not radical or aggressive but rather seeks to mould the international system to its benefit (7).

This Chinese revisionism fits the broad criteria of a multilayered challenging of existing norms at the domestic, regional, and international level, which is enabled (among other things) by technology (8). In fact, China’s international rise is the answer to internal challenges and domestic growth is a precondition of its global status. “China cannot have one without the other.” (7, p. 966) Furthermore, the Chinese government works to shape international standards for digital technologies, and AI in particular, enabling it to spread its authoritarian norms within global governance frameworks. Technology itself also enables the CCP to censor and manipulate information internally repressing dissent and freedom of expression (3). Through the combination of these actions, the CCP is effectively using technology to reshape norms at multiple levels, in a truly revisionist fashion, with its techno-authoritarian model serving as counter-normative framework to liberal democratic ideas, domestically and abroad.

China’s generative AI industry

In the past year in particular, China has seen great growth in its generative AI industry. Chinese models are among the most downloaded on Hugging Face (9) and appear to have similar performance to US counterparts (10), as well as rivalling them on Chatbot Arena (11). In particular due to DeepSeek’s models entering at number 7 in the style-controlled ranking. The company, which is establishing itself as a global leader (12), has also recently developed a model with “reasoning” capabilities likely comparable to GPT-o1 (13). This rapid growth was just as much the result of investment by Chinese tech companies as much as it was part of a plan by the government to dominate the industry by 2030 (14). The government has acted as a “policy maker, incubator, investor in AI startups, supplier of research, customer of AI applications, and more.” Making it the force “behind every successful Chinese AI firm” (15), in the hope that AI dominance could help shift global balance of power and boost a slowing economy (16).

However, the CCP also sees “generative AI opening up vast new ways for information to spread outside its control.” (14) to which it has responded by enacting regulation that is strict on freedom of speech and content control (15). The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) has set out broad rules for the sector to ensure that content generated does not “subvert state power, incite secession, harm national unity or disturb the economic or social order.” As well as being in line with the CCP’s “socialist values” (14). A more recent draft for AI regulation has also presented “a “negative list” of areas and existing products that AI companies should stay clear of unless they have explicit government approval.” (17) It is important to note that similar rules applied to the internet have previously enabled the Party to effectively repress speech on sensitive topics. Indeed, the “arbitrary nature of the CAC’s proposed rules means that it can tighten or loosen them as it sees fit.” And it is well known that “the Chinese government has a habit of rewriting and selectively enforcing rules based on the whims of President Xi Jinping.” (14)

What does this all mean?

Domestically, the CCP views generative AI as a double-edged sword: a catalyst for innovation and economic growth, but also a potential threat to its ideological dominance. As it tries to balance regulation and innovation, Beijing imposes stringent regulations ensuring AI outputs conform to “socialist values” and avoid topics that might undermine state narratives or stability. By tightly controlling AI systems, the government is effectively managing “to both tame and harness those AI algorithms that have the power to shape public opinion online.” (18) AI tools are not only censored but are used “to refute rumours and promote ‘positive energy.’” (18), demonstrating how deeply intertwined technological progress and authoritarian governance have become. As part of this censorship approach the CCP appears to have enacted a blanket firewall against the domains of western AI providers (19). Yet, interestingly, western models are not entirely absent from the Chinese market. Meta’s Llama model, for example, is reportedly being adapted for military use by the Chinese armed forces (20), leaving space to wonder how the domestic regulatory regime is actually impacting AI development.

On the global stage, the CCP’s AI ambitions mirror its broader revisionist vision of reshaping international systems to its advantage. By 2030, Beijing aims to establish itself as the world leader in AI, not just in technological capacity but in defining the ethical and regulatory frameworks that govern its use (14). This push to set global AI standards is a clear attempt to embed authoritarian values that prioritise state control and stability into international governance. Indeed, if left unchecked, the Chinese government might be “capable of ‘spreading certain cultural aspects’ that are likely to undermine the liberal democratic order” (21). The US government seems to have understood this, as evidenced by recent actions such as stricter export restrictions on advanced chips (22, 23). US companies also seem on board (24), perhaps by virtue of the revolving door that connects their boards to the Government and Defence apparatuses (25).

Looking ahead, China’s trajectory in generative AI suggests a future where technological leadership tied to ideological influence. If current trends continue, Beijing could emerge not only as a dominant AI innovator but also as a key architect of global digital norms, promoting a model that prioritizes control, censorship, and state-led governance. As generative AI becomes more embedded in global infrastructure, the question of which framework for norms and regulation will emerge remains open, and the CCP seems set on finding the answer.

Reference list
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